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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to the Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 3, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) • 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the 
plaintiff, Olson, was entitled to contribution from defendant 
Park? 
On appeal from a summary judgment this Court resolves 
only legal issues and does not defer to the trial court's rulings. 
It determines only whether the trial court correctly held that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact and whether the 
trial court erred in applying the governing law to the facts. 
Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). 
2. If Olson was entitled to contribution from Park, 
did the trial court err in calculating the amount of contribution 
to which Olson was entitled? 
This is a question of law which the Court reviews tor 
correctness. See Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); 
Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Sys., Inc., 319 N.C. 534, 356 
S.E.2d 578, 586-87 (1987) . 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding that Park's 
counterclaim did not state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted? 
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The Court will affirm a dismissal for failure to state 
a claim only if it clearly appears that the claimant can prove 
no set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v. Utah State 
Land Board, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1990). In making this 
determination the appellate court must accept the material alle-
gations of the claimant's pleading as true, construe the pleading 
in the light most favorable to the claimant and indulge all rea-
sonable inferences in his favor. Id.; Arrow Indus., Inc. v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). 
4. Did the trial court err in awarding Olson attor-
ney fees incurred in the present action as well as in the earlier 
action of First Security Bank v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc.? 
This is a question of law, which the Court reviews 
for correctness. See Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The plaintiff, H. Glenn Olson, brought this action 
seeking indemnity from defendant Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. and con-
tribution from defendants J. Samuel Park and Ellis Edward Craig 
for amounts he paid to First Security Bank as a co-guarantor 
on certain notes. Defendant Park counterclaimed against Olson 
for unreimbursed expenditures he advanced and services he per-
- 2 -
formed in obtaining releases of other obligations that Olson 
had guaranteed. The trial court dismissed Park's counterclaim 
and entered summary judgment in favor of Olson. Park-Craig-Olson, 
Inc. and Park have appealed the trial court's Order Dismissing 
Counterclaim of J. Samuel Park; Summary Judgment Against Park-
Craig-Olson, Inc. and J. Samuel Park; and Order Denying Objections 
to Proposed Orders. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Defendant Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. ("PCO") was at 
all relevant times a Utah corporation. Except for the period from 
January 1985 through September 1987, defendant J. Samuel Park held 
54.33 percent of the outstanding shares of the corporation. At 
all relevant times defendant Ellis Edward Craig owned 29 percent 
and the plaintiff, H. Glenn Olson, owned 16.67 percent of the out-
standing shares of the corporation. Record ("R.") at 240-41 5 
2. 
2. PCO owned and operated six Marie Callender rest-
aurants—one in Arcadia, California, and five in Utah (on Foothill 
Drive in Salt Lake City, on 3900 South in Salt Lake City, in 
Bountiful, in Midvale and in West Valley City). Ici. at 241 f 3. 
3. In operating the restaurants, PCO incurred certain 
debts, including obligations on two notes to First Security Bank 
(the "Bank"). The first note, dated November 17, 1981, was for 
the principal amount of $215,000.00. The second note, dated 
- 3 -
January 6, 1983, was in the principal amount of $225,000.00, 
Id. at 243-44 I 7; 103 I 3; 117; 120. 
4. PCO was also obligated under real estate leases 
for each of its six locations, id. at 245 5 8. 
5. By separate instruments, Park, Craig and Olson 
each personally guaranteed PCO's indebtedness to the Bank. 
The personal liability of each guarantor was limited to $550,000. 
Id. at 103 1 4; 124-26. 
6. Park, Craig and Olson also personally guaranteed 
certain other obligations of PCO, including the leases for the 
West Valley City, Bountiful and Foothill Drive stores and two 
master franchise agreements with Marie Callender Pie Shops, Inc. 
Olson personally guaranteed a renewal lease on the Arcadia store 
for which Park was not a guarantor. Id. at 245-46; 403 I 11. 
7. On January 30, 1985, defendant Park sold his shares 
in PCO to a group of investors known as the Marsh Group. Id. at 
242 f 4. 
8. In the summer of 1987, the Marsh Group defaulted 
on its payments to Park. At this time Park learned that the 
restaurants owned and operated by PCO were in serious financial 
trouble, threatening the investment of PCO's shareholders, in-
cluding Mr. Olson. Ld. at 243 I 6. 
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9. PCO defaulted on its payments to the Bank, and in 
June 1987 the Bank sued PCO and Park, Craig and Olson, as 
guarantors on the notes. Id. at 107-16. 
10. In September 1987, Park repossessed his shares in 
PCO from the Marsh Group. Id. at 243 I 6; 400 I 7. 
11. From August 1987 through June 1988 Park personally 
expended his own time and money to try to save PCO's restaurants. 
He negotiated with creditors, sought sources to refinance PCO's 
debts, and sought buyers for PCO's assets. Id. at 247-49. 
12. Despite the fact that Olson was a shareholder of 
PCO and was personally liable as guarantor on several of PCO's 
obligations, Olson did not assist in any of these efforts and 
refused to participate in any negotiations with creditors or to 
contribute any funds to the work-out efforts. Id. at 248 f 13. 
13. Through Park's efforts and expenditure of funds, 
Olson was released from his liability as guarantor on the leases 
of the West Valley City, Bountiful, Foothill Drive and Arcadia 
stores, either directly or through cancellation of the underlying 
obligations. The landlord of the West Valley City store, however, 
insisted that Park remain personally liable as a guarantor on 
that lease, which he did. Id. at 250-52. 
14. At the time Olson was released from his guaranty 
of the West Valley City lease, the lease had a remaining term of 
nineteen years at the rate of the greater of $6,424.50 or 5.5 
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percent of gross sales per month, for a minimum total remaining 
obligation of $1,464,786.00. The West Valley City location was 
the least profitable of all the PCO locations and was incurring 
average net operating losses of $15,000.00 per month, including 
the lease payment. Id. at 251 I 15(a). 
15. At the time Olson was released from liability as 
a guarantor of the lease on the Arcadia store, there was 
$91,948.07 in accrued and unpaid percentage rent due under that 
lease. Jd. at 407 I 17(b). Park was not a guarantor of the 
Arcadia lease. JId. at 245-46 1 8(e). 
16. At the time Olson was released from liability as 
a guarantor of the lease on the Foothill Drive store, there was 
$70,935.18 in accrued and unpaid percentage rent due under that 
lease. Id. at 408 1 17(c). 
17. At the time Olson was released from liability as 
a guarantor of the lease on the Bountiful store, the lease had 
a remaining term of 208 months at the rate of $4,420.00 per month, 
for a total remaining liability of $919,360.00. The Bountiful 
location was historically unprofitable and was eventually closed 
because of poor performance. Id. at 252 I 15(d). 
18. A significant part of Park's efforts was also ex-
pended negotiating the release of the guarantors on the two fran-
chise agreements with Marie Callender Pie Shops, Inc.— with 
respect to the Arcadia and Foothill Drive stores. Through Park's 
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and, under his second claim, contribution from Park and Craig. 
Id. at 2-7. 
25. Park counterclaimed against Olson, seeking payment 
for monies he advanced and services he performed to rescue PCO 
and to obtain releases of PCO's obligations that Olson had per-
sonally guaranteed. Id. at 397-411. 
26. The trial court dismissed Park's counterclaim, 
granted summary judgment in favor of Olson and against all defen-
dants, and denied the defendants' objections to the form of the 
orders. Id. at 482-83; 528-30; 592-94; 605-08; 612-14; 615-18. 
The judgment against PCO included an award of $2,500.00 for at-
torney fees incurred in this action. Id. at 616 5 C. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Park and Olson were co-guarantors of PCO's debt to 
the Bank. Olson was only entitled to contribution from Park if 
Olson paid more than his proportionate share of PCO's debt and 
Park did not pay his proportionate share. Neither condition was 
met in this case. The trial court erred in concluding that Olson 
was entitled to contribution from Park because Park had paid 
more than his share of PCO's debt (point I-A) and Olson did not 
pay more than his share (point I-B). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. ' THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING Will VT" OLSUN WAS.1 ENTITLED 
TO CONTRIBUTION FROM, PARK. 
A. Park Was Not Liable for Contribution Because He 
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J1' . uiii I I, 11 mi iniiii i i i f 11 II i IAIIIII nils! Iliarqp1 mmre I lian 1 l i s 
p r o p o r t i o n a t e s h a r e of h i s p r i n c i p d l s debt i s en t . i t itid t o c o n -
t r i b u t i o n from a r n - q n a r a n t o T m c o - s u r e t y Gardne r v . Bean
 f 
i i , -L 1 1 i i in in in mi mi i I I I  I  i II I  II mi i I I I  | mi i " i r i i c i m I M i r S e n ' i i v II 1 ) i"v 1 4 ("i" 
| 194 1 | ) 1 son c l a i m e d that , he wa.s en! i t led t o c o n t r i b u t i o n Irom 
Tin I null (Ya iq IN I IIUHP the* t h r e e of them were c o - g u a r a n t o r s of 
bL'LI s de 111 I 11 ilit1 Billik d fn I L \ i in i 11 11i1 m | KI I I IIIU I I • I, I'm111j 11 i i: f:"i. 11a r H 
of tha t debt. 
Nowhere in the record does it state the entire amount 
owing to the Bank on April 15, 1988, the date Olson made the 
payment for which he seeks contribution. For this reason alone, 
the trial court erred in granting Olson's motion for summary 
judgment against Park because, without knowing the entire amount 
of the debt, the trial court could not say as a matter of law 
that Olson had paid more than his proportionate share of the 
debt—a prerequisite to Olson's claim for contribution. Never-
theless, assuming that PCO's total liability was the total amount 
paid to the Bank on PCO's debts, the total liability would have 
been $319,307.65 (the $235,000 paid by Park plus the $84,307.65 
paid by Olson). Assuming further that Olson is correct in ar-
guing that the co-guarantors' proportionate share of liability 
should have been based on their respective percentage of ownership 
in PCO (a proposition Park disputes, see infra, part I-B), Olson 
was still not entitled to contribution from Park. 
The law is clear that, where one guarantor pays less 
than the entire debt owed by the principal but more than his 
share, he can recover from any co-guarantor who has not paid his 
share "such excess up to the amount of the unpaid share of the 
other . . . ." Restatement of Restitution § 85 comment e (1936). 
Olson's payment was clearly less than the entire amount that 
PCO owed the Bank. Thus, he was only entitled to contribution 
from Park if Park had not paid his share of the debt. Under 
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 The idi I that Park was reimbursed might tjai or 1 unit 
any claim he may have had against Olson for contribution, see 
Restatement of Restitution § 85 comment c, but Park has not sought 
contribution from Olson for any payment Park made to the Bank in 
excess of his proportionate share. 
or where, by the terms of their contracts of guaranty, they pro-
vide that each shall be jointly and severally liable and that 
each shall bear an equal proportion of the obligation, see 38 
Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 128; Curtis v. Cichon, 462 So.2d 104, 
106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). Park, Craig and Olson each guar-
anteed PCO's indebtedness to the Bank up to $550,000, and each 
was jointly and severally liable. R. at 124-26. The fact that 
they were all equally liable to the Bank (up to $550,000 each) 
shows that they in fact intended to bear equally any liability 
to the Bank. 
The common law rule of equal contribution holds true 
even if the loan is on behalf of a corporation and the guarantors 
are shareholders of the corporation whose ownership interests 
in the corporation are not equal. Curtis, 462 So.2d at 106; 
Brill v. Swanson. 36 Wash. App. 396, 674 P.2d 211, 212-13 (1984); 
Miller v. Miles, 400 S.W.2d at 7. This is because the guarantors' 
liability in such a case arises from the guaranty agreement, 
not from their status as stockholders. Curtis, 462 So.2d at 
105; 13A C. Thompson, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 6219 at 35 (rev. perm. ed. 1984). Park, for exam-
ple, remained personally liable on his guaranty even after he 
severed his relationship with PCO in January 1985 and was not a 
shareholder in PCO in June 1987, when the Bank sued him on his 
guaranty. 
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because his and Park's ownership of stock in PCO was unequal, 
the exception applies and each should be liable in proportion 
to his shares of stock in PCO. Apart from the fact that other 
courts have rejected similar arguments, see, e.g.f Curtis, 462 
So.2d at 105-06; Miller, 400 S.W.2d at 7-5; Brill, 674 P.2d at 
213, Olson has failed in his burden of proving that the bene-
fits he and Park received from their common obligation were un-
equal . 
The record shows that the Bank's first loan to PCO was 
made on November 17, 1981, and was for a period of five years. 
R. at 10. The Bank's second loan was made on January 6, 1983, 
and was also for a period of five years. .Id. at 13. PCO de-
faulted on the loans some time before May 26, 1987. Jd. at 12-
15. Although Park was a stockholder of PCO when the loans were 
made and the guarantees given, he sold his stock in PCO in January 
1985 and did not repossess it until September 1987, after PCO 
defaulted on the loans and the Bank brought its action. Id. at 
242 & 246. Park remained personally liable as a guarantor on 
the obligations throughout this period but, because he had sold 
his PCO shares, did not receive any benefit from the loans after 
January 1985. Thus, there was a period of over two years in 
which Park received no benefit from the common obligations to 
the Bank while Olson, as a stockholder in PCO, did receive a bene-
fit. The trial court erred in requiring Park to pay a dispro-
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at 617. Even if Olson were otherwise correct in arguing that 
Park's and Craig's liability for contribution should be based 
on the parties' respective percentages of stock ownership in 
PCO, the principal obligor, the trial court applied the wrong 
measure of damages, 
A co-guarantor has a right to contribution only after 
he has paid more than his proportionate share of the entire debt 
and can be reimbursed only for amounts he paid in excess of his 
proportionate share. See Gardner v. Bean, 677 P. 2d 1116, 1118 
(Utah 1984); Restatement of Security § 154 comments c, d & £; 
18 Am Jur. 2d Contribution § 24. In determining the plaintiff's 
proportionate share in a case such as this, the court must con-
sider the amount owed and not the amount paid in settlement. 
Sacks v. Tavss, 237 Va. 13, 375 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1989). Even 
if Olson were correct that his proportionate share was 16.67 
percent (his percentage ownership in PCO), his proportionate 
share of the total debt would be $53,228.59 (16.67 percent of 
$319,307.65). He is only entitled to contribution for the amount 
he paid in excess of his proportionate share, or in other words, 
for $31,079.06 ($84,307.65 minus $53,228.59). This amount alone 
is less than the judgment against Park. But Park would only be 
liable for his proportionate share of this amount. Using Olson's 
theory of proportionality, as between Park and Craig, Olson's 
co-obligers, Park's share of the overpayment would be 65.2 percent 
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rnE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PARK'S COUNTERCLAIM 
DID NOT STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED. 
A* Park's Counterclaim Should Not Have Btten Dismissed If 
the Facts Alleged Would Entitle Him to Relief Under Any 
Legal Theory. 
The trial court dismissed Park's countexclaim, on the 
grounds that it failed tn state a claim on which relief could be 
granted. See R, ml .1,1,', -It).1 -1,1 I 
A dismissal Is a severe measure and should not have been 
giant:pel nu'lt^ ss \t wnr. clear that Park was not entitled to relief 
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his 
claim. See, e.g. , Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 132 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 3-4 (Utah 1990); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). "The courts are a forum for 
settling controversies, and if there is any doubt about whether 
a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the 
issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an oppor-
tunity to present its proof." Colman, 132 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
4. 
In reviewing the dismissal of Park's counterclaim, the 
Court must accept the material allegations of the counterclaim 
as true and must construe the counterclaim in the light most 
favorable to Park and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. 
Id. ; Arrow Indus. , 767 P. 2d at 936. As discussed below, Park has 
set forth facts which establish a claim for relief under a theory 
of quantum meruit. 
B. Park Has Set Forth Facts Which Establish a Claim for 
Relief in Quantum Meruit. 
Quantum meruit allows recovery for labor performed in 
a variety of circumstances in which the claiming party would not 
be able to sue on an express contract. Davis v. Olson, 746 P.2d 
264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The purpose of allowing recovery 
under the theory of quantum meruit is to prevent the defendant's 
enrichment at the plaintiff's expense. .Id. at 269. 
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Quantum meruit has two distinct branches. The first 
branch consists of contracts implied in law (also known as quasi-
contract or unjust enrichment), the elements of which are: "(1) 
the defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge 
by the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that 
would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without paying for it." Id. The second branch consists of con-
tracts implied in fact, the elements of which are: (1) the de-
fendant requested the plaintiff to do the work; (2) the plaintiff 
expected the defendant to compensate him for his services; and 
(3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff 
expected compensation. Id. As neither party has claimed the 
existence of an "implied in fact" contract based on conduct, 
Park will concentrate only upon the first branch of quantum 
meruit, namely, contract implied in law (quasi-contract or unjust 
enrichment). 
A quasi-contractual relation is one that is "created 
by the law for reasons of justice, without any expression of 
assent and sometimes even against a clear expression of dissent." 
See 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 19 at 46 (1963). Consi-
derations of equity and morality play a large part in finding a 
quasi-contract. Id, 
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Park's counterclaim states a claim upon which relief 
can be granted since all three elements of a claim for quasi-
contractual relief are pled and each is supported by the record. 
1. Olson Received a Benefit. 
A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives the 
other some interest in money, land or possessions, performs ser-
vices beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a 
debt of the other or in any way adds to the other's advantage. 
Restatement of Restitution § 1, comment b. The facts in the record 
establish that Park conferred a benefit on Olson by securing 
his release from literally millions of dollars' worth of potential 
liability as a personal guarantor on four leases and two franchise 
agreements: the leases on the West Valley City, Bountiful, Arcadia 
and Foothill Drive stores and the franchise agreements with re-
spect to the Arcadia and Foothill Drive stores. These obligations 
represented some $2.8 million in potential liability for Olson. 
Cf. Sparks v. Gustafson, 750 P.2d 338, 342 (Alaska 1988) (plain-
tiff's services by which he kept the defendant's business oper-
ating and paid its debts conferred a benefit on the defendant). 
Olson himself admitted in his deposition that Park's 
services and efforts in obtaining the releases of the guarantees 
were of value to him: 
Q. (By Mr. Shields) Let me represent to you 
that you have, in fact, been released 
from your guarantees on the West Valley 
and Bountiful leases. Assuming that 
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representation to be true, obtaining 
those releases was of value to you, 
was it not, in terms of forgiving your 
guarantee obligation? 
A. Yes. 
Olson Deposition at p. 43, lines 12-18.2 
2. Olson Had an Appreciation or Knowledge of the Bene-
fit. 
From the record, one can reasonably infer that Olson 
knew of the benefit that he received from Park's efforts. Olson 
knew that he was obligated as a guarantor on the notes to the 
Bank, on the leases and on the franchise agreements because he 
was a party to those guarantees. See R. at 401-03 If 9-11. 
Olson knew that PCO was in dire financial straits as early as 
February 19, 1987, when he telephoned defendant Craig and proposed 
that they, as minority stockholders, sue Park and two successive 
management groups. See id. at 512 5 4. Moreover, Olson investi-
gated PCO's financial affairs in June 1987, when he contacted 
an officer of First Security Bank. Olson Deposition at 35. 
Olson knew that Park was trying to negotiate compromises with 
creditors, a sale of PCO's assets and a release of their guaranty 
obligations because Park asked him "to participate in the nego-
tiations or to help in any way, either financially or in person," 
but Olson refused. R. at 254 f 15(f) & 248 I 13. Finally, Olson 
1
 The cited portions of Olson's deposition are reproduced 
in the Addendum. 
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and his counsel had an opportunity to review the proposed agree-
ment for the sale of PCO's assets to Marie Callender Ventures, 
Inc. before the sale took place and knew or should have known 
that, as a result of the sale that was negotiated by Park, Olson 
would be released from his personal guarantees on the Bountiful 
and West Valley City store leases• Olson Deposition at 44-45 & 
ex. 6. From all of these facts, one can conclude that Olson 
knew of the benefit he received from Park's efforts. 
3. The Circumstances Surrounding the Benefit Conferred 
on Olson Made It Unjust for Him to Retain the 
Benefit Without Paying for It. 
It is clear from the allegations of the counterclaim 
that Olson refused to participate in the negotiations which saved 
PCO from ruin. Without Park's substantial efforts in obtaining 
a buyer, Olson would have been subject to joint and several li-
ability on the four real estate leases and the two franchise 
agreements. Park's services resulted in the release of Olson 
as a personal guarantor on over a million dollars' worth of cur-
rent or potential liabilities. Park repeatedly asked Olson to 
participate in the negotiations with creditors and potential 
buyers and to contribute to the transactions that were neces-
sary to save PCO from ruin, but Olson refused to participate in 
any way. Yet, when Park's efforts resulted in releases of Olson 
from personal liability on the four real estate leases and the 
two franchise agreements, Olson readily accepted the fruits of 
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Park's labors. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for 
Olson to retain the benefit of Park's services without paying 
for them. 
This case is similar to Sparks v. Gustafson, 750 P.2d 
338 (Alaska 1988). The plaintiff in that case performed manage-
ment services that kept the defendant's business operating, paid 
its debts and made substantial repairs and improvements to its 
property. 750 P. 2d at 342. The court held that it would be 
just to require the defendant to compensate the plaintiff because 
the plaintiff's services were of the type for which one would 
ordinarily expect to be paid and benefited the defendant (although 
they may also have benefited the plaintiff). See id. at 343. 
Similarly, Park's extensive efforts to save PCO by negotiating 
with and paying off creditors were the sort for which one would 
ordinarily expect to be paid, and Park in fact asked Olson to 
contribute to these efforts, "either financially or in person." 
R. at 254 5 15(f). Park's efforts clearly benefited Olson, and 
he accepted and retained that benefit. Under the circumstances, 
it would be inequitable to allow him to retain the benefit without 
paying for it. 
Olson argued below, however, that his retention of the 
benefit of Park's services was not inequitable because Park per-
formed the services for his own advantage, making any benefit to 
Olson "incidental." 
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Olson relies for his position on Berrett v. Stevens, 
690 P.2d 553 (Utah 1984)- The plaintiffs in that case sold real 
property to the defendants under contract. The defendants gave 
Murray First Thrift (MFT) a mortgage on the property to secure 
a loan for improvements. To insure repayment of the loan, MFT 
required the defendants to obtain credit life insurance policies. 
One of the buyers died, and a dispute arose over the amount due 
under the life insurance policy. At the same time, the defen-
dants became delinquent in their payments to the plaintiffs under 
the real estate contract. The plaintiffs agreed to accept a 
deed from the defendants in lieu of foreclosure and to assume 
the obligation to MFT. The plaintiffs further agreed that, if 
the defendants' claim for additional insurance proceeds was re-
solved in their favor and the "disputed amount" was either ap-
plied against the loan from MFT or paid directly to the plain-
tiffs, the plaintiffs would pay "said same amount" to the defen-
dants. At the time the parties entered into this agreement, 
the defendants were claiming an additional $10,000.00 in insurance 
proceeds. The insurance company eventually paid an additional 
$20,000.00. The plaintiffs paid the defendants $10,000.00 of 
this amount and applied the rest to the defendants' obligation 
to MFT, which the plaintiffs had assumed. The defendants, how-
ever, claimed that they were entitled to the entire $20,000.00. 
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The court concluded that there was "little doubt that 
plaintiffs did receive some benefit" from the defendants' efforts 
in making the claim for additional insurance proceeds and pursuing 
negotiations with MFT and the insurance company. 690 P. 2d at 
557. "However," the court continued, "the mere fact that a person 
benefits another is not by itself sufficient to require the other 
to make restitution. The value of services performed by a person 
for his own advantage and from which another benefits incidentally 
are not recoverable." Id. at 557-58 (footnotes omitted). 3 Olson 
relies on this language for his argument that Park failed to state 
a claim for unjust enrichment. Olson argues that Park performed 
the services for his own advantage, so any benefit to Olson must 
have been incidental. 
Olson is wrong on both counts. Park's services were 
not performed for his own advantage, and any benefit to Olson was 
not "incidental." 
Park's services were meant to save PCO from financial 
ruin. Park first advanced money to save PCO in August 1987. 
At that time, Park was not even a stockholder of PCO. (He repos-
3 Berrett did not establish a new element for a claim 
for unjust enrichment. The party making such a claim does not 
need to prove that the services he performed were not incidental. 
Rather, whether or not the services were performed for his own 
advantage and whether or not any benefit to the other party was 
incidental are simply factors the court may consider in deter-
mining whether retention of the benefit without payment would 
be inequitable under the circumstances. See 690 P.2d at 557-
58. 
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sessed his PCO shares from the Marsh Group in September 1987.) 
See R. at 404 f 14 & 403 f 13. Olson, on the other hand, was a 
shareholder of PCO throughout the relevant time. More impor-
tantly, with respect to two of the obligations, Park's efforts 
to secure Olson's release from personal liability did not result 
in any corresponding benefit to Park. First, Park secured 
Olson's release from liability as a guarantor on the lease of 
the Arcadia store, even though Park was not a guarantor on that 
lease and thus was not personally liable on that obligation, as 
Olson was. Second, through Park's sole efforts the landlord of 
the West Valley City store was persuaded to release Olson as a 
guarantor on that lease but insisted that Park remain personally 
liable as a guarantor on the lease, which he did. One can 
hardly say that Park performed that service for his own advantage 
where he remained personally liable for a lease obligation of 
$1,464,786 and Olson emerged with absolutely no personal liability 
whatsoever. Thus, Park's services were performed for PCO's ad-
vantage, not Park's, and benefited Olson in ways Park was not 
benefited. 
Moreover, any benefit to Olson was not "incidental." 
"Incidental" means "occurring merely by chance or without inten-
tion or calculation." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 580 
(1977). Park spent a significant part of his efforts to save the 
PCO enterprise in negotiating the release of Olson from the four 
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leases and two franchise agreements. R. at 406-08 II 17 & 18. 
One can infer from this that the release of Olson from his per-
sonal liability on those obligations did not occur "merely by 
chance or without intention or calculation." In this regard, 
this case is distinguishable from Berrett, the case Olson relies 
on. The benefit in that case "was clearly unanticipated by either 
of the parties." 690 P. 2d at 557 (quoting the trial court's 
memorandum decision). Moreover, Berrett involved an express 
contract that clearly limited the plaintiffs' liability. See 
690 P. 2d at 557. In the present case there is no explicit limi-
tation based on an express contract, and the benefit conferred 
on Olson was clearly not "incidental." 
Park's extensive services, rendered in the face of 
Olson's refusal to involve himself in the affairs of the corpora-
tion, directly resulted in the release of Olson from over a 
million dollars' worth of personal guarantees. Olson himself, 
in his deposition, admitted that those services were of value to 
him; certainly, these are "circumstances that would make it unjust 
for the [plaintiff] to retain the benefit without paying for 
it." Berrett, 690 P.2d at 557. 
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IV, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING OLSON ATTORNEY FEES 
INCURRED IN THIS ACTION AS WELL AS IN THE EARLIER ACTION OF 
FIRST SECURITY BANK V. PARK-CRAIG-OLSON, INC. 
A guarantor who has paid the principal obligation is 
entitled to reimbursement from the principal debtor. See, e.g. , 
Western Coach Corp. v. Roscoe, 133 Ariz. 147, 650 P.2d 449, 453 
(1982); Restatement of Restitution §§ 76 & 80. If the guarantor 
became a surety on the principal obligation with the consent or 
because of the fault of the principal debtor, he is entitled to 
reimbursement for all expenses reasonably incurred by him in 
connection with the obligation. Restatement of Restitution § 
80 & comment d. The record in this case is silent as to whether 
or not Olson became a guarantor with the consent or because of 
the fault of PCO. If he voluntarily became surety for PCO with-
out PCO's consent or fault, he is only entitled to reimbursement 
to the extent that his payment to the Bank diminished the debt 
of PCO. Id. comment c. Because Olson failed to show that he 
became a guarantor with PCO's consent or fault, he is entitled 
to be reimbursed only for the payment he made on PCO's debt and 
not for any attorney fees incurred in the Bank's action against 
him, since the latter did not diminish PCO's debt to the Bank. 
Moreover, Olson is not entitled to be reimbursed for 
his attorney fees in this action. In Utah, attorney fees may 
be awarded only if provided by statute or contract. The only 
statute that Olson relied on in the trial court—Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 7 0A-3-415(5)—is inapplicable. That statute states, "An ac-
commodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, and 
if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the instru-
ment against such party." The statute defines "accommodation 
party" as "one who signs the instrument . . . for the purpose 
of lending his name to another party to it." Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-3-415(l) (emphasis added). Olson did not sign the instruments 
that he claims give him his right to attorney fees, namely, PCO's 
notes to the Bank. Thus, he is not an accommodation party within 
the meaning of the statute. Cf.. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. 
Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 158-59 (Utah 1987) (an accommodation party 
is one who signs the note as a surety); First Nat'l Bank of Lavton 
v. Egbert, 663 P.2d 85, 86 (Utah 1983) (cosigners of notes were 
accommodation parties). 
Moreover, there is no contract between Olson and PCO 
entitling Olson to recover his attorney fees incurred in this 
action. Under the circumstances, the general rule applies, 
namely, that an indemnitee cannot recover his attorney fees in-
curred in establishing his right to indemnification. See, e.g. , 
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 450 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988); Peter Fabrics, Inc. v. S.S. "Hermes", 765 F.2d 
306, 316 (2d Cir. 1985); Chetopa State Bancshares, Inc. v. Fox, 
6 Kan. App. 2d 326, 628 P.2d 249, 256 (1981). The reason for this 
rule is that costs incurred in establishing the existence of an 
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obligation to indemnify are costs incurred for breach of an 
implied contract to indemnify and thus "fall within the ordinary 
rule requiring a party to bear his own expenses of litigation." 
Peter Fabrics, Inc., 765 F.2d at 316 (citation omitted). 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in awarding 
Olson his attorney fees incurred in this and the earlier action 
of First Security Bank v. Park-Craiq-Olson, Inc., et al. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed in part I, supra, the Court 
should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment against 
Park on Olson's second claim for relief and remand this case to 
the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Park. At 
a minimum, for the reasons discussed in part II, supra, the case 
should be remanded so that the amount of the judgment against 
Park can be corrected. 
For the reasons discussed in part III, supra, this 
Court should reverse the dismissal of Park's counterclaim and 
remand this action to the trial court to allow that claim to be 
decided on its merits. 
On Olson's first claim for relief, the Court should 
reverse that part of the judgment awarding Olson his attorney's 
fees and remand this action to the district court for entry of 
a modified judgment in favor of Olson. 
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1 GOING TO GO AFTER P . C O . , AFTER ELLIS CRAIG OR AFTER ME FOR 
2 THAT PAYMENT. EVENTUALLY, I HAD TO PAY IT. 
3 Q ALL RIGHT. BUT WHEN YOU GOT SUED BY FIRST 
4 SECURITY IN JUNE OF 1987, DIDN'T YOU WONDER AT THAT POINT 
5 WHAT WAS GOING ON? 
6 A YES. 
7 Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO THAT, DID YOU 
8 I START INVESTIGATING WHAT WAS HAPPENING? 
A YES. 
10 | Q ALL RIGHT. TELL ME WHAT YOU DID TO FIND THAT 
OUT. 
12 I A I CONTACTED THE OFFICE ON FOOTHILL BOULEVARD, AND 
13 ALL I COULD--UNSATISFACTORY TO THE INFORMATION THEY WOULD 
14 GIVE ME OR THE HELP THEY WOULD GIVE ME IS THAT THE BILL 
15 WOULD BE—OBLIGATION WOULD BE TAKEN CARE OF. 
16 Q FIRST SECURITY TOLD YOU THAT THE OBLIGATION WOULD 
17 J BE TAKEN CARE OF? 
A NO. THE OFFICE AT MARIE CALLENDER ON FOOTHILL 
19 I BOULEVARD. 
20 I Q I SEE. 
A THE FELLOWS IN CHARGE OF THE BOOKS AND EVERYTHING. 
22 | THEY SAID, "WE HAD BEEN IN THE HOLE. WE'RE MAKING MONEY NOW 
23 i AND EVERYTHING'S ALL RIGHT. I THINK THAT THE OBLIGATIONS 
24 I WILL BE TAKEN CARE OF." 
25 Q DO YOU RECALL WHO YOU TALKED TO? 
35 
21 
1 Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, WERE YOU AWARE, PRIOR TO DECEMBER 
2 OF 1988, THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS RESULTED IN YOUR BEING 
3 RELEASED FROM YOUR PERSONAL GUARANTEES ON THE LEASES ON 
4 BOUNTIFUL AND WEST VALLEY? 
5 A NO. 
6 Q ALL RIGHT. DO YOU KNOW THAT NOW? 
7 A NO. 
8 Q PRIOR TO THIS OCCASION TODAY, DID YOU EVER WONDER 
9 WHAT WAS HAPPENING WITH THE WEST VALLEY LEASE IN TERMS OF 
10 THE FACT THAT YOU MAY BE CALLED ON TO PAY ON YOUR GUARANTEE? 
H A NO. 
12 Q LET ME REPRESENT TO YOU THAT YOU HAVE, IN FACT, 
13 BEEN RELEASED FROM YOUR GUARANTEES ON THE WEST VALLEY AND 
14 BOUNTIFUL LEASES. 
15 ASSUMING THAT REPRESENTATION TO BE TRUE, OBTAINING 
16 THOSE RELEASES WAS OF VALUE TO YOU, WAS IT NOT, IN TERMS OF 
17 FORGIVING YOUR GUARANTEE OBLIGATION? 
18 A Y E S-
19 Q AND THE VALUE WOULD BE, WOULD IT NOT, THE REMAINING 
20 AMOUNT OF THE LEASE OBLIGATION? 
21 A I DON'T UNDERSTAND YOUR QUESTION. 
22 Q WELL, MY QUESTION IS, UNDER BOTH OF THOSE LEASES, 
23 AT THE TIME THAT YOUR GUARANTEE WAS RELEASED, THERE WERE 
24 SEVERAL YEARS STILL YET TO GO ON BOTH OF THEM. DO YOU HAVE 
25 ANY PROBLEM WITH THAT REPRESENTATION? 
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A I'M NOT AWARE OF IT. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AND YOU WERE A JOINT PERSONAL GUARANTOR 
ON BOTH OF THOSE LEASES, CORRECT? 
A OKAY. 
Q OKAY. SO BUT FOR THOSE RELEASES, YOU WOULD HAVE 
HAD A CONTINGENT OBLIGATION TO SATISFY THOSE, WOULD YOU NOT? 
A WELL, I WAS ASSUMING THAT WHEN SAM SOLD OUT, THAT 
WHOEVER BOUGHT THE STORES WOULD HAVE ASSUMED ALL THOSE 
LEASES. 
Q AND THEY DID. LET ME REPRESENT TO YOU THAT THEY 
DID. 
A OKAY. 
Q MR. OLSON, LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT I'LL HAVE MARKED 
AS EXHIBIT 6. 
(WHEREUPON, DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO. 6 WAS 
MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.) 
Q (BY MR. SHIELDS) THIS IS A LETTER DATED JUNE 21, 
1988, FROM YOUR COUNSEL TO MY CO-COUNSEL IN THIS CASE, 
MR. ARMSTRONG. HAVE YOU EVER SEEN THIS LETTER BEFORE? 
A YES. 
Q ALL RIGHT, LOOKING AT THE CARBON COPY INDICATIONS. 
MR. OLSON, THAT LETTER INDICATES THAT YOU OR YOUR LEGAL 
COUNSEL RECEIVED NOTICE OF A MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS IN THE 
CORPORATION SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 22, I BELIEVE, RIGHT ON THE 
FIRST PAGE, CONCERNING VOTING ON THE SALE TO MARIE CALLENDER'S 
4*4 
EXAM BY SHI ELDS 
VENTURES OWNED BY RAMADA. 
IS THAT YOUR RECOLLECTION, THAT YOU HAD NOTICE 
OF THAT MEETING PRIOR TO IT OCCURRING? AS A MATTER OF FACT, 
I BELIEVE IT TALKS ABOUT IT IN THE VERY FIRST PARAGRAPH OF 
THE LETTER. 
A WELL, WHATEVER'S INCLUDED IN THE LETTER. THE 
LETTER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. 
Q ALL RIGHT. WELL, THE REASON I ASKED THAT IS THIS 
LETTER IS NOT FROM YOU, IT'S FROM YOUR LEGAL COUNSEL, AND 
PM JUST MAKING SURE THAT YOU WERE AWARE OF THE INFORMATION 
CONTAINED IN THE LETTER. I GUESS WHAT YOUfRE TELLING ME IS 
THAT YOU WERE. 
MR. PANZER: LET ME CLARIFY YOUR QUESTION, JEFF. 
ARE YOU STILL TALKING JUST ABOUT THE SPECIAL MEETING OF 
SHAREHOLDERS? 
MR. SHIELDS: YES. 
Q (BY MR. SHIELDS) I'M TRYING TO ASK, MR. OLSON, 
WHETHER YOU PERSONALLY EVER HAD NOTICE OF THAT MEETING PRIOR 
TO THE DATE IT WAS SCHEDULED FOR, THAT BEING JUNE 22. 
A I DON'T RECALL. 
Q ALL RIGHT. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, YOU DID NOT ATTEND 
THAT MEETING. IS THAT CORRECT? 
A I DON'T RECALL. 
Q SO YOUR TESTIMONY IS THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHETHER 
YOU WENT OR YOU DIDN'T GO? 
^5 
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SNOW, C H H I S T E N S E N & M A E T I N E A U 
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June 21, 1988 
Hand Delivered 
Brent R. Armstrong 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: H. Glenn Olson/Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. 
Special Meeting of Shareholders set for June 22, 1988 
Dear Brent: 
We have now had an opportunity to meet with our client, 
Glenn Olson, regarding the above-referenced special meeting of 
shareholders and the subject matter thereof, i.e., the sale of 
the assets of PCO to Marie Callender Ventures, Inc. Mr. Olson 
wishes to advise the company and Sam Park that generally he does 
not object to a sale of the assets of PCO, and does not wish to 
exercise any dissenter's rights available under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 16-10-75 and -76. On behalf of Mr. Olson, we would, however, 
like to express the following concerns and objections to the 
sale as proposed in the Asset Sales Agreement, a draft of which 
was furnished to us, and the proposed disbursement of the sale 
proceeds. 
As you are well aware, it is the opinion of Mr. Olson that 
hundreds of thousands of dollars were wrongfully paid by PCO to 
Sam Park, Doug Powelson, the L.D.S. Church, and Merrill Lynch 
Private Capital, from and after the date Mr. Park sold his stock 
in PCO to the Marsh group. Because of the state of the records, 
and, in particular, the commingling of bank accounts and financial 
records (which, incidentally, appears to have continued to date), 
it is difficult to tell the exact nature and extent of the payments 
It is perfectly clear, however, that Sam Park, Doug Powelson, and 
Merrill Lynch Private Capital group had complete knowledge that 
PCO was making the payments, even though the true indebtedness 
was that of the Marsh group. In fact, it is reported to us 
that Sam Park specifically requested the bookkeeper to set up 
the balance due him as a note payable on PCO's records. 
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In short, Mr. Olson is of the opinion that PCO has substantial 
claims against Sam Park, Doug Powelson, the L.D.S. Church and 
Merrill Lynch Private Capital on account of these monies. Each 
payment would, under the circumstances, be a fraudulent conveyance 
or otherwise recoverable under applicable law. Despite this 
knowledge, Mr. Park, as controlling shareholder of PCO since last 
fall, has made no attempt to recover the fraudulent conveyances. 
We believe the money wrongfully paid to these individuals and 
entities were a proximate cause of the apparent failure of the 
business. Obviously, other factors enter into this, most noteably 
the large amounts of money apparently withdrawn by MacArthur and 
Marsh. Mr. Park is not, however, without blame. In addition, 
there are the potential claims we have discussed regarding liability 
of Mr. Park for the sale of the controlling interest in the cor-
poration to the Marsh group. At this time, we do not know the 
extent of Mr. Park's knowledge of the financial arrangements 
between Marsh and Merrill Lynch Private Capital or whoever else 
financed the purchase; however, we suspect that Mr. Park was 
fully aware of such arrangements and the likelihood that PCO 
assets would be used to repay the Marsh indebtedness, essentially 
making the transaction a leveraged buyout (but without buying out 
the minority shareholders). 
It has been impossible for Mr. Olson to analyze the financial 
aspects of the proposed sale of PCO assets, primarily because the 
assets have been lumped together with Sam Park's other stores and 
are being sold as a group. It is not possible to determine the 
consideration being paid for the PCO as opposed to non PCO stores. 
Accordingly, although the transaction may be considered fair if 
between a single buyer and seller, it is not possible to determine 
whether, for example, Marie Callender Ventures is assuming debts 
of Sam Park stores in consideration for the purchase of PCO stores. 
The proposed Asset Sales Agreement also appropriates to 
Sam Park apparent PCO opportunities, by providing for a payment 
to Sam Park of 50% of any negotiated decreases in "old debt." 
See Exhibit C, paragraph (h). There is also a $25,000 cash payment 
to Mr. Park that is unexplained. 
Mr. Park is also to receive $560,000 on account of alleged 
loans to PCO. Although represented to us that this is only a 
portion of the amounts he has advanced, it is not at all clear 
that that is correct. If Mr. Park advanced monies to his other 
stores, which he owns personally, it could hardly be said that 
he is owed money by himself. We were advised that he advanced 
approximately $560,000 to PCO, but do not know the truth of that 
representation. 
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As you are aware, Mr. Olson paid $84,307.65 to First Security 
Bank on account of debts owed by PCO. To that extent at least, 
Mr. Olson is a direct creditor of PCO; however, this debt is 
apparently not disclosed and is certainly not paid as a consequence 
of the sale. Instead, we understand that Mr. Park, who supposedly 
advanced $235,000 to pay off the remainder of the First Security 
debts, intends to take the full amount of his advance out of the 
sale proceeds. We do not have any idea how this disparate treat-
ment can be justified, except on the fact that Sam Park owns a 
controlling interest in the corporation. 
We request that the company add to proposed Exhibit "D", 
Excluded Assets, claims against Doug Powelson, Merrill Lynch 
Private Capital, J. Samuel Park, and Ann Park. 
While the proposed sale appears to be an arms length trans-
action, and it appears Marie Callender Ventures is, viewed as a 
whole, paying a fair consideration, it is not possible to determine 
whether a fair consideration is being received by PCO. Mr. Olson 
objects to the proposed disbursement of sale proceeds. First, it 
is our contention that Mr. Park is not owed anything by PCO. Any 
funds he put into PCO since last fall were, in our opinion, merely 
repayments of fraudulent conveyances. Secondly, Mr. Park is, to 
the extent he receives payment on account of a reduction of debt 
by negotiation, misappropriating a corporate opportunity. Thirdly, 
Mr. Olson should, at a bear minimum, receive payment on account of 
the First Security loan to the same extent Mr. Park receives pay-
ment. If Mr. Park is going to be repaid in full, Mr. Olson should 
also be paid in full. 
In closing, we wish to advise you that absent a fair and 
reasonable settlement with Mr. Olson on account of his claims and 
the claims of PCO against Mr. Park and others, it is the intention 
of Mr. Olson to forthwith initiate a lawsuit. It is likely that 
a derivative action will also be brought, since many of the claims 
against Mr. Park are, at first blush, property of PCO. To the 
extent a demand is necessary, please consider this letter a demand 
that the company initiate actions against Mr. Park, Doug Powelson, 
and Merrill Lynch Private Capital to recover fraudulent convey-
ances and assert other claims against the individuals and entities. 
We presume, however, that no such actions will be brought because 
of Mr. Park's majority ownership of the stock of PCO. 
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Mr. feaic does not intend 
the shareholders. 
to attend the special meeting of 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
BDP/sw 
cc: Glenn Olson 
Reed Martineau 
